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ABSTRACT
We examine the career paths of attorneys in the Enforcement Division at the SEC. Using
a variety of performance metrics, we find evidence that long term lawyers and lawyers in
regional offices do not perform as well as other SEC attorneys. We also report that men
and women may differ in their career paths in this field. We find that early-stage female
attorneys perform just as well as male attorneys. Notwithstanding their comparable
performance, these early-stage women are less likely to get a raise or promotion. We find
that women are more likely to stay at the SEC, at least at earlier points in their careers. We
also find evidence that attorneys who perform well at the SEC are more likely to leave the
agency, and that their destination is more likely to be a partnership at a law firm,
contradicting the “revolving door” hypothesis.
Keywords: SEC enforcement
Data: publicly available, FOIA requests
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1.

Introduction

Numerous papers have studied the enforcement choices of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the impact of the agency’s enforcement actions, but
little scholarly attention has been paid to the attorneys who do the actual work of the
Enforcement Division. Those attorneys are responsible for conducting the investigations
that lead to the filing of enforcement actions and for litigating those cases once they are
filed. What are the incentives faced by those individuals? How do they perform? Who
gets ahead at the SEC? Who leaves the SEC, and where do they go when they leave?
Understanding the career patterns of SEC enforcement attorneys may shed light on their
incentives. This paper attempts to begin filling this gap in the literature.
Our focus is on attorneys employed by the SEC’s Division of Enforcement in
2004. We obtained the list of SEC Division of Enforcement attorneys from the SEC’s
2004 Telephone Directory.1 Using publicly available information, as well as data
obtained from the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED) project at NYU2
as well as from the SEC through FOIA requests, we track their employment paths
through June 2016. Using this sample, we evaluate a series of hypotheses relating to the
career patterns of lawyers at the Enforcement Division.
We look at the performance of attorneys in the Enforcement Division. We
conjecture that long term attorneys stuck in the Division are likely to underperform. We
find some evidence to support this “dead wood” hypothesis, with long term attorneys
involved in fewer court cases, fewer cases brought against individuals, and fewer cases in
which another regulator is involved.
We also examine differences in performance between men and women employed
in the Division. We find that women are less likely to be assigned to Rule 10b-5 cases.
When we break this out, however, we find that the effect holds for females with
management positions, but not for women who are staff attorneys or who have recently
been employed in the Division. Recently hired female attorneys at the SEC take on cases
similar to their male counterparts and produce similar results. Our other performance
variables also show women lagging behind male counterparts, except for women who
were recently hired and also those who are long term SEC employees.
We also look at compensation patterns. Despite equivalent performance of
recently hired female and male SEC attorneys, we find that recently hired male attorneys
are more likely to get pay raises and promotions than female attorneys from 2004 to
2014. We find no difference between men and women in the payment of bonuses
measured in 2014.

Despite our best efforts, we were unable to find SEC Telephone Directories more recent than the
2004 edition.
2 The SEED project is a joint venture between the NYU Pollack Center for Law and Business and
Cornerstone Research.
1
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Our next set of tests looks at who stays at the SEC. We conjecture women may be
more inclined to stay at the SEC relative to male counterparts because government work
may offer a more manageable schedule that may fit better with greater family caregiving
obligations. We further conjecture that attorneys who perform well at the SEC, as
measured by the significance of the enforcement actions that they are involved in, will be
less likely to stay at the SEC because their outside employment options will be more
attractive. This hypothesis contradicts the “revolving door” hypothesis (Smallberg 2011),
which posits that SEC attorneys will be inclined to pull their punches in bringing
enforcement actions because it will enhance their job prospects when they depart for the
private sector.
We find that women are more likely to stay at the SEC, but this effect goes away
for women who are long term SEC attorneys. Attorneys who work in the regional offices
are also more likely to stay. We also find that attorneys who were partners in large law
firms before coming to the SEC are more likely to depart, consistent with a credentialing
hypothesis; attorneys from private practice go to the SEC for a limited time to gain
experience as well as the imprimatur of having worked at the SEC. Consistent with our
“anti-revolving door” hypothesis, we find that attorneys who perform well are more
likely to leave the agency. Specifically, we find attorneys who are associated with the
strongest enforcement cases as measured by the average number of civil court cases, the
average number of 10b-5 court cases, the average number of court cases where there is
another U.S. regulator involved, and the average number of court cases where an
individual is targeted are more likely to depart.
Our final set of tests looks at the landing spot for attorneys who choose to leave
the SEC. We find that women are less likely to land positions as law firm partners or in
the financial services industry relative to their male counterparts. This effect is mitigated,
however, for women with more experience. We see that attorneys in regional offices are
also less likely to leave for top-paying positions. By contrast, top managers are more
likely to leave for these positions. Finally, we find that the strongest performers at the
SEC are the attorneys most likely to land positions as partners in private practice after
leaving the SEC.
We proceed as follows. Part 2 surveys the prior literature in this field and
develops hypotheses. Part 3 describes our sample and our empirical tests. Part 4 provides
a brief conclusion.

2.

Prior literature and hypotheses

2.1 Prior literature
The existing empirical work on SEC enforcement looks at the outputs generated
by the SEC’s enforcement work,3 focusing on sanctions imposed and consequences for
companies and their officers when they are implicated in financial misconduct. Very little
3

For an overview, see Choi & Pritchard (2016).
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empirical attention has been paid to the attorneys who do the actual work of the
Enforcement Division. This dearth may in part reflect the limited availability of relevant
data. The SEC does not disclose its investigations until an enforcement action is filed.
Even then the attorneys responsible for the case will only be revealed if the case is filed
in court and the attorneys are required to enter an appearance. If the enforcement action is
pursued in an administrative proceeding, the SEC’s enforcement release may or may not
reveal the names of the attorneys responsible for the action.4
To date, the only substantial empirical work on SEC enforcement attorneys is
DeHaan et al. (2016). They collect data on the career paths of SEC enforcement division
lawyers involved in SEC cases involving accounting misrepresentations over the period
1990-2007. They find minimal differences in the enforcement outcomes for “revolving
door” lawyers that eventually leave the SEC to join law firms relative to other lawyers.
However, the lawyers that leave to join law firms that specialize in defending clients
against the SEC are associated with stronger enforcement effort, as proxied by higher
damages collected, a higher likelihood of criminal proceedings, and a higher likelihood of
SEC actions that charge the CEO. Overall, they conclude that the revolving door
promotes more aggressive regulatory activity, rather than an attempt to curry favor with
prospective employers. Their findings suggest that SEC attorneys are anxious to show
their ability to promote their job prospects.
This pattern is consistent with individuals viewing time spent working in
government as an investment in human capital (Sauer 1998), offering an opportunity to
specialize (NALP 2004). It is commonly understood that many attorneys will view
experience at the SEC as a valuable credential, lending them credibility as white collar
defense attorneys, conducting internal investigations, or serving as a legal advisor to
firms in financial services subject to regulation by the SEC. The desire to bolster
credentials may be reflected in their job performance. For example, Boylan (2005) finds
that the length of prison sentences is positively related to subsequent career trajectories
for U.S. Attorneys. In related work, Boylan & Long (2005) find that prosecutors in
districts where private sector salaries are relatively high compared to government salaries
are more likely to take cases to trial, which they attribute to a desire to gain relevant
experience.
Attorneys may vary in their motivation for working at the SEC. Some will be
attracted to a career in public service, enjoying the opportunity to wear the “white hat.”
(Weisbrod, 1983). Similarly, many will find the work of the SEC inherently interesting
and challenging. For other lawyers, government employment may offer more manageable
hours than the private sector. Some individuals will be willing to forego a bigger
paycheck in exchange for more time for family or other obligations. Government lawyers
report working fewer hours than their private sector counterparts (NALP 2004).

In recent years, the SEC has been more forthcoming with the names of SEC personnel involved in an
administrative proceeding in its news releases. We leave further examination of SEC personnel
associated with administrative proceedings for future work.
4
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A more manageable work/life balance may be particularly important to some
woman, who choose to take on greater family caregiving obligations. Those obligations
are commonly offered as reasons why the compensation and status of women in the legal
profession trails that of men. The entry of women into the legal profession took off in the
1970s (Rosen 1992) and women now represent roughly half of law school graduating
classes. Equivalent numbers, however, have not necessarily translated into equivalent
status in the profession or compensation, particularly in the private sector. Having
children is more likely to depress women’s income in the private sector than in
government (Dixon & Seron 1995), perhaps because women are less likely to become a
partner in the largest law firms (Sterling & Reichman 2016). On average, female lawyers
make 85% of what male lawyers earn (NALP 2009), a narrowing of a long standing
disparity (Hagan 1990).
Does gender influence career paths? Survey research indicates that women in the
early portion of their careers are disproportionately represented in government legal
positions (NALP 2004), but this differential is not found for federal government
employment and narrows as lawyers get further into their careers (NALP 2009). Thus,
having more women in lower-paid government employment may explain a portion of the
overall gender gap in pay among lawyers noted above, but not all of it. Even among
lawyers working for the federal government, women report earning 6% less pay than
male lawyers (NALP 2009). This may reflect the fact that women employed as lawyers
by the federal government report working fewer hours than their male counterparts
(NALP 2009). It is unclear, however, if this reflects a choice by women to work fewer
hours or supervisors giving them less substantive assignments. In this regard, it is worth
noting that female attorneys working for the federal government report lower levels of
job satisfaction than men (NALP 2009).
2.2 Hypotheses
As discussed above, for some individuals, a stint at the SEC is a useful stepping
stone to a more lucrative position in the private sector, the so-called “revolving door”
studied by DeHaan et al. (2016). As discussed above, critics worry that this revolving
door makes the staff of the SEC too cozy with the industry that it regulates. Defenders of
the practice counter, however, that the possibility of moving to a lucrative position in the
private sector down the road allows the SEC to attract better quality job candidates to the
agency. Moreover, establishing a reputation for intelligence and energy in pursuing the
SEC’s enforcement agenda may be a more marketable credential than an effort to curry
favor with prospective employers.
Not everyone, however, will succeed in translating their SEC experience into
lucrative private sector employment. Some attorneys will stay at the SEC, not by choice,
but because there are no private sector opportunities available to them. This possibility
suggests a reverse selection effect, with the best lawyers leaving the agency for more
lucrative opportunities, leaving the less ambitious behind (Goddeeris 1988). For these
attorneys, it may be difficult to stay motivated in their work for the agency. As the years
Choi & Pritchard
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pass, a reverse selection effect may manifest itself, with those remaining long term at the
SEC being relative underperformers.
H1:

Long term SEC attorneys are likely to be enforcement underperformers.

No a priori reason would suggest that men and women should differ in their
performance as enforcement attorneys. Moreover, both law and government policy
mandate that men and women be treated equally in the terms of their employment. All
else equal we should expect women in the Enforcement Division to perform the same and
be treated the same as their male counterparts. It is worth noting, however, that some
literature suggests that woman lawyers may lag behind their male counterparts in
receiving challenging assignments (Sterling & Reichman 2016), which may affect their
performance and compensation.
H2:

Male and female attorneys will perform similarly and will be compensated
similarly.

Our next set of hypotheses relates to whether attorneys are likely to leave the
SEC, and if they do, their destination. Based on our conversations with enforcement
division attorneys, we speculated that men and women may follow different career paths
at the SEC. In particular, some women may choose to take on greater family obligations
in the middle of their careers relative to men, which may make the relatively manageable
hours of a government job attractive. (Women just starting their careers may delay
childbirth; women who have sent their children to college may have more time to devote
to their careers.) Some women, however, may drop out of the labor market temporarily
while their children are young, returning after they send their children to school. Their
absence from the labor pool for a time may affect their opportunities for advancement.
H3:

Women attorneys with the least experience and the most experience will be more
likely to leave the SEC than women in the middle of their careers.

H4:

Women attorneys will be less likely than men to leave the SEC for positions as
law firm partners and with financial institutions.

As noted above, some will view service at the SEC as a credentialing device.
These attorneys come to the SEC with the intention of returning to the private sector after
a few years of service. Boylan (2004) shows that tenure in office for U.S. Attorneys is
influenced by salaries available in alternative private sector employment. We predict that
attorneys who have come to the SEC from lucrative private sector employment will be
more sensitive to the pain of forgoing immediate income for government service, and
thus, more apt to leave the SEC for more profitable employment.
H5:

Attorneys who leave partnerships with law firms to join the SEC will be more
likely to leave the SEC for law firm partnerships.

Choi & Pritchard
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Our last hypothesis relates to the destination of attorneys who leave the SEC.
Following DeHaan et al (2016), we posit that attorneys who are effective performers at
the SEC will develop reputations that they can translate into highly-paid positions in the
private sector.
H6:

SEC attorneys who are high performers will be more likely to leave the SEC
for the private sector.

3.

Data and empirical results

3.1

Sample

Our sample consists of attorneys who worked in the SEC’s enforcement division in
2004. We obtained the names of the employees of the Enforcement Division from the
SEC’s 2004 telephone directory. We supplement this information with information about
subsequent positions at the SEC through FOIA requests. These requests yielded employee
names, job titles and grades, and postings, through 2014. We also collected pay grade
information from federalpay.org that reports data obtained from the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management. We use this information to classify the attorney hierarchically.
Our categories are as follows:
Staff Attorney

Employed by the SEC at SK-14 or below, who would be
considered the entry-level attorneys.

Top Manager

Employed by the SEC at SK-17 and above. These attorneys
typically have the title of Assistant Director, Assistant District
Administrator, or Assistant Regional Director, or higher.

The baseline category for comparison in our tests is all attorneys in SK-15 and 16.
We also distinguish among the various SEC offices. We code attorneys as Regional
if they are employed in an office other than New York or Washington, DC. Given the
concentration of the financial services industry in New York, and the concentration of the
white collar defense bar in Washington, attorneys in those offices may more private sector
options than attorneys working in regional offices such as Fort Worth or Miami (Boylan
2004).
Using publicly available information, we track the employment choices of the
attorneys in our sample through June 2016. We collected background information on the
SEC attorney names through Internet searches, including the Martindale Hubbell dataset
on LexisNexis, LinkedIn, and Google. These searches yielded information on prior and
subsequent employment and when the individual started at the SEC. We use this
background information to construct a number of variables relating to their employment
subsequent to the SEC. We also create an indicator variable to reflect work experience
prior to coming to the SEC: NLJ 250 Prior Partner, which is defined as 1 if the attorney
Choi & Pritchard
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was a partner at one of the 250 largest law firms in the US before coming to the SEC. We
conjecture that these attorneys are most likely to view experience at the SEC as adding a
valuable credential. We posit that attorneys with prior government experience are more
likely to see government employment as a long-term career path and may perform at a
higher level as a result. To test the importance of prior government experience, we create
the indicator variable Prior Gov Attorney. To test the importance of education (Rebitzer &
Taylor 1995), we research the law school attended by the individual and their graduation
year. We use the law school attended for our variable, Top Law School, which we define
as the top 18 law schools as ranked by U.S. News in 1992.
To help us understand how the work that these attorneys have done at the SEC
influences their career patterns, we also collected the number of SEC civil enforcement
cases against public companies in which these attorneys were involved from 2004 to 2015,
which we used to calculate their average number of cases per year while at the SEC (Any
Cases). Our source for this data is the complaints for SEC civil actions against public
companies obtained from the SEC’s website, from Bloomberg Law, or from the SEED
database. For each complaint, we recorded the names of the SEC attorneys listed at the
bottom of the complaint. Our approach is underinclusive in that we do not track SEC
attorney involvement in actions involving private companies or administrative
proceedings. Prior to 2010, the SEC did not regularly list the attorneys involved in SEC
administrative proceedings. Our focus on public companies allows us to focus on those
attorneys that get the highest profile cases at the SEC. The downside of this approach is
that it does not include cases such as insider trading and pump-and-dump schemes, which
will primarily involve individuals.
For the period 2004 to 2015, we also collected detailed information about
enforcement actions in which violations of Rule 10b-5 were alleged. For actions involving
public companies, Rule 10b-5 actions requires proof of scienter and thus we conjecture are
more serious cases of fraud and that the highest performing attorneys at the SEC will be
assigned to them. We computed the average number of Rule 10b-5 cases per year in which
an attorney was involved (10b-5 Cases). All else equal, a higher number for this variable
suggest greater involvement enforcing against substantial fraud. More serious cases may
attraction the attention of multiple regulators, so we create the variable Other Government,
which is the average number of cases per year from 2004 to 2015 against public companies
in which another regulator, such as DOJ or a state attorney general, also brought an action
against the company. We also create the variable Individual Actions, which is the average
number of cases per year from 2004 to 2015 against public companies in which an
individual was also named as a defendant. Naming an individual may indicate that the
Division has taken a tougher stance in settling a potential enforcement action. Finally, we
create the variable Officer Resignations, which is the average number of cases per year
from 2004 to 2015 against public companies in which an officer of the company was
terminated or resigned as a result of the enforcement action.
We classify attorneys who started in 1990 or earlier as Long Term (corresponding
to attorneys with 15 years or more experience as of the end of 2004). We classify attorneys
who started in 2000 or later as Short Term (corresponding to attorneys with five years or
Choi & Pritchard
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less of experience at the SEC as of the end of 2004). We use the Short Term category to
examine the career patterns for the relatively recent hires at the SEC as of 2004. The
baseline category is attorneys who started between 1991 and 1999.
We also construct variables relating to compensation and promotion. We obtained
data on compensation and employment position at the SEC from www.federalpay.org
which reports pay data from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. We calculate the
average base pay change for the attorneys for each year from 2004 to 2014 (or the last
year the SEC attorney was employed at the SEC if earlier than 2014) as a percentage of
their prior base salary (Average Base Pay % Change). We calculate Bonus Ratio as the
bonus in 2014 (or last year at SEC) divided by base pay in 2014 (or base pay in last year
at SEC). Finally, we code Promotions Rate, which is the average number of ranks the
SEC attorney is promoted per year from 2004 to 2014 or the last year the SEC attorney
was employed at the SEC if earlier than 2014. Variable Definitions are provided in the
Appendix. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample.
[Insert Table 1 here]
We first look at the status of the attorneys in our sample as of 2004 in Panel A of
Table 1. The average attorney had 13.9 years of experience and is approximately 40 years
old. Nearly 4% were close to retirement age in 2004, which we define as 55 or older in
2004 or over 65 years of age by 2015. Short Term attorneys make up 47.2% of the
sample. Only 14.9% of the attorneys employed in 2004 were Long Term attorneys.
Women were 30.0% of the sample. Only 6.7% of the SEC attorneys had been partners at
NLJ 250 firms (NLJ 250 Prior Partner). In contrast, 17.5% of the SEC attorneys had
served as a government attorney prior to joining the SEC (Prior Gov. Attorney).
Attorneys were employed in regional or district offices (other than New York) made up
43.9% of the sample.
Looking at responsibilities, Staff Attorneys make up 37.1% of the sample. This is
an entry-level position for which individuals can be hired with minimal experience at a
firm or other government agency. These attorneys do the bulk of the investigative work
of the Division. Top Managers made up 22.9% of the sample.
Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the attorneys in our sample.
We see that the SEC is a long term destination for many of the attorneys, with close to
half (47.5%) still employed by the SEC as of 2016. Looking at the cases in which the
attorneys are involved, the average attorney was listed as appearing in 0.145 cases per
year and 0.081 Rule 10b-5 cases per year between 2004 and 2016. Other regulators (e.g.,
DOJ or state attorneys general) were involved in 9.2% of the cases. For the average
attorney, 9.9% of the cases involved actions against individuals as well as a corporate
defendant, and in 7.5% of the cases an officer resigned or was terminated as a result of
the investigation.
Looking at compensation and promotion, the average attorney in our sample got
annual base pay increases of 5.5% (Average Base Pay % Change). In addition, they were
Choi & Pritchard
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promoted 0.135 pay grades, on average, per year along the SEC pay scale that ranges
from SK-1 to S-17 for employees and then SO-1 to SO-3 for Senior Officer positions
(Promotion Rate).
3.2

Who Succeeds at the SEC?

How do long-term SEC employees compare with attorneys hired more recently?
Are they equally effective, more effective a result of greater experience, or less effective
because they have burned out? Consistent with H1, the “dead wood” hypothesis, we
conjecture that Long Term staff attorneys are likely to underperform. We are also
interested in comparing the performance of men and woman (Hypothesis H2).
As our dependent variable for this analysis, we use the attorney’s average cases
per year that include Rule 10b-5 allegations (10b-5 Cases). We treat an attorney as
involved in a Rule 10b-5 case only if the complaint for the case lists the SEC attorney’s
name. The SEC has a range of violations that it can allege against public companies, but
only Rule 10b-5 allegations require proof of scienter. Other violations involving
misleading disclosures can be premised on negligence or strict liability. Thus, Rule 10b-5
cases are the ones that allege intentional wrongdoing, which makes them both more
challenging to prove, but also arguably reflecting violations that cause investors greater
damage. Our focus on complaints and SEC civil actions omits other activities of SEC
attorneys including participation in administrative proceedings, investigations,
rulemaking, and so on. Nonetheless, to the extent civil actions represent the highest
profile activities of SEC attorneys, we expect that the highest performing SEC attorneys
will be assigned to Rule 10b-5 civil actions.
We estimate a regression model with 10b5 Cases as the dependent variables with
robust standard errors. The base model (Model 1) is as follows:
10b5 Casesi = α
+
+
+
+
+

+ ß1iShort Termi + ß2iLong Termi
ß3iNLJ 250 Prior Partneri + ß4iPrior Gov. Attorneyi
ß5iTop Law Schooli + ß6iRegional Officei
ß7iStaff Attorneyi + ß8iTop Manageri
ß9iFemalei + ß10iFemale x Staff Attorneyi
ß11iFemale x Top Manageri + εi

In Model 1, we include a number of independent variables. We include the
indicator variable Long Term to examine whether longer-term SEC attorneys correlate
with lower performance. We also include the indicator variable for Short Term to control
for the possibility that individuals who are relatively early in their tenure may have fewer
opportunities to work on the most significant cases. The baseline category for these
regressions is attorneys who joined the agency between 1991 and 1999 (Medium Term).
We include indicator variables for attorneys who were previously NLJ 250 Prior Partners,
who may come to the agency with greater experience, as well as who were previously
Prior Government Attorneys, who may also have greater experience with government
enforcement actions. We include an indicator variable for Top Law School if the SEC
Choi & Pritchard
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attorney went to one of the top 18 law schools as ranked by U.S. News and World Report
in 1992 (Top Law School). We include the indicator variable for whether the SEC
attorney is based in a Regional Office, which may have a different mix of cases. We
include indicator variables for Staff Attorney, Top Manager, and Female attorney. We
also include variables interacting Female with Staff Attorney and Top Manager. Table 2
reports the results for Model 1. In Model 2, we replace those interaction terms with
interaction variables for Female x Short Term and Female x Long Term. We present the
results for Model 2 in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In Models 1 and 2, note that the indicator variables for Short Term and Long
Term are insignificant. We do not find any evidence that either Short Term or Long Term
SEC attorneys are correlated with different performance compared with the base category
of Medium Term SEC attorneys.
Looking at our control variables, attorneys in Regional Offices have fewer 10b-5
cases (significant at the 5% levels in Models 1 and 2) as do Staff Attorneys (not
significant however). The coefficient for Top Manager is positive and significant at the
1% level in both models. This may reflect their supervisory responsibilities, which
require them to be involved in more cases, while lower level attorneys may be putting
more time into fewer individual cases.
Looking at our gender variables, Female correlates with fewer 10b-5 cases in both
of the models (significant at the 1% levels in Models 1 and 2). When we add interaction
variables between Female and Staff Attorney and Female and Top Manager in Model 1,
we find that females who are staff attorneys perform the same as males who are staff
attorneys with respect to Rule 10b-5 cases.5 In contrast, females who are Top Managers
tend to underperform males who are Top Managers for 10b-5 cases.6 Model 3 adds
interactions between Female x Short Term and Female x Long Term. The sum of Female
and Female x Short Term is not significantly different from zero, indicating that short
term female attorneys participate in the same number of 10b-5 cases as short term male
attorneys.7 Similarly, the sum of Female and Female x Long Term is not significantly
different from zero.8 The underperformance of females for these cases is confined to the
Medium Term female SEC attorneys.
As a robustness test, we removed the indicator variables for Short Term and Long
Term and interaction terms with Short Term and Long Term from Model 2 of Table 2
and added Experience with an interaction variable between Experience and Female.
Unreported, we found that the coefficient on Experience was not significant but the
The sum of Female and Female x Staff Attorney in Model 1 is not significantly different from zero (F‐
test p‐value = 0.8578).
6 The sum of Female and Female x Top Manager in Model 1 is negative and significant at the 1% level
(F‐test p‐value = 0.0027).
7 The sum of Female and Female x Short Term in Model 2 is not significantly different from zero (F‐
test p‐value = 0.5629).
8 The sum of Female and Female x Long Term in Model 2 is not significantly different from zero (F‐
test p‐value = 0.1874).
5
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coefficient on Experience x Female was negative and significant at the 1% level,
consistent with higher performance for more junior female SEC attorneys compared with
more senior female SEC attorneys.
We wanted to see if the relations identified from the regressions presented in
Table 2 held for other potential measures of performance. Accordingly, we re-ran the
regression specified in Model 2 of Table 2 with alternative dependent variables. We
estimate regressions for four independent variables: 1) an OLS model using the number
of SEC civil court cases for any cause of action as the dependent variable (Any Cases); 2)
an OLS model using the number of SEC civil court cases for any cause of action in which
an individual is named per year as the dependent variable (Individual Cases); 3) an OLS
model using the number of SEC civil court cases in which another regulator brings
charges per year as the dependent variable (Other Regulator); 4) an OLS model using the
number of SEC civil court cases in which an officer resigns as the dependent variable
(Officer Resignations). The independent variables are the same as those used in the
Model 1 presented in Table 2. We present the results of these estimations in Panel A of
Table 3. We also used the same independent variables as those used in Model 2 of Table
2 and present the results in Panel B of Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here]
We do not see a consistent pattern for these metrics of performance, with a couple
of exceptions. The coefficient for Long Term is negative and significant at the 10% level
in two of the four models (Any Cases and Individual Cases) in both Panels A and B of
Table 3, offering some support to Hypothesis 1. We also find a significant negative
coefficient for Staff Attorney in three of the four models (Any Cases, Individuals, and
Officer Resignations) in Panel A and two of the four models (Individuals and Officer
Resignations) in Panel B. Staff Attorneys are less likely to be involved in these cases with
significant consequences for culpable individuals. In both Panel A and Panel B, SEC
attorneys from Regional Offices tend to underperform in three of the four models (Any
Cases, Individual Cases, and Other Regulator). As in Table 2, Top Managers outperform
in all the models of Panels A and B.
In contrast to the results presented in Table 2, the coefficient for Female is
significant in only one of the four models in Panel A of Table 3 (Individual Cases;
negative and significant at the 10% level). Moreover, the interaction terms between
Female and Staff Attorney are insignificant in all the models and the interaction term
between Female and Top Manager is significant in only one of the four models of Panel
A (Individual Cases; negative and significant at the 10% level). We find stronger results
in Panel B where Female is negative and significant at the 1% level in all four models.
The interaction term between Female and Short Term is positive and significant at the 1%
level in all four models and the sum of Female and Female x Short Term is not
significantly different from zero.9 The interaction term between Female and Long Term
is also positive in all four models but not significant and the sum of Female and Female x

The p‐values for the F‐test of the sum of Female and Female x Short Term are as follows: Model 1 p‐
value = 0.2679; Model 2 p‐value=0.5620; Model 3 p‐value = 0.3431; and Model 4 p‐value = 0.6099.
9
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Long Term is not significantly different from zero.10 As in Table 2, the results from Panel
B indicate that although relatively new hire female SEC attorneys perform at the same
level of new hire male SEC attorneys, Medium Term females tend to underperform
Medium Term male SEC attorneys. We conclude that there is some evidence that
contradicts Hypothesis #2 particularly for the Medium Term attorneys at the SEC.
3.3

Who Gets Paid and Promoted at the SEC?

We next look at the pattern of pay raises at the SEC. Attorneys at different stages
in their career at the SEC may experience different patterns of pay and promotion. We
focus our analysis only on the Short Term SEC attorneys to compare attorneys at roughly
the same point in their careers. Focusing on Short Term SEC attorneys also allows us to
consider whether gender differences exist in pay and promotion among newly hired SEC
attorneys as they pursue their career at the SEC.
Our first focus is on the annual percentage change in base salary for the attorneys
in our sample (Average Pay % Increase) measured from 2004 to 2014 or the last year the
attorney was employed at the SEC. We estimate the following regression model with
robust standard errors.
Average Pay % Increasei = α + ß1iNLJ 250 Prior Partneri
+ ß2iPrior Gov. Attorneyi + ß3iTop Law Schooli
+ ß4iRegional Officei + ß5iStaff Attorneyi
+ ß6iTop Manageri + ß7iFemalei + εi
We include independent variables for NLJ 250 Prior Partner, Prior Government
Attorney, Top Law School, Regional Office, Staff Attorney, Top Manager, and Female to
assess the relationship between the various attorney characteristic variables and pay
increases at the SEC. We present the results of these estimations in Model 1 of Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 here]
We see that SEC attorneys who work in a Regional Office receive lower pay
increases over time compared with SEC attorneys working either in Washington DC or
New York City (coefficient on Regional Office negative and significant at the 5% level).
We also find that those newly hired SEC attorneys who are a Staff Attorney in 2004 are
more likely to receive a pay increase (coefficient on Staff Attorney positive and
significant at the 1% level), likely because they start at a much lower salary than
attorneys who start at a higher level than Staff Attorney. Lastly, note that the coefficient
on Female is negative and significant at the 10% level. All other things being equal,
newly hired female SEC attorneys receive lower pay increases over time compared with
newly hired male SEC attorneys. These results stand in sharp contrast to the results in
Tables 2 and 3, which showed that, if anything, recently hired women outperformed their
male counterparts. These results suggest that newly-arrived female attorneys were being
The p‐values for the F‐test of the sum of Female and Female x Long Term are as follows: Model 1 p‐
value = 0.3267; Model 2 p‐value=0.2483; Model 3 p‐value = 0.5231; and Model 4 p‐value = 0.1782.
10
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given challenging assignments, but not receiving pay increases commensurate with that
effort.
We also looked at bonuses. The SEC may have greater discretionary ability to
reward high performance through bonus payments instead of base pay changes. For this
analysis, we used the ratio of bonus to base salary for the year 2014 or the SEC attorneys
last year at the SEC (Bonus Ratio) as our dependent variable. We use the same
independent variables as in Model 1 of Table 4 and report the in Model 2 of Table 4.
Unlike Model 1, we do not find evidence that female SEC attorneys receive any different
bonuses compared with male SEC attorneys.
Finally, we looked at who was promoted in the Enforcement Division. For this
analysis, we use Promotion Rate as our dependent variable and our independent variables
are the same as used in the estimations presented in Table 2. We use the same
independent variables as in Model 1 of Table 4 and report the in Model 3 of Table 4. We
present the results in Model 3 of Table 4.
Unsurprisingly, Staff Attorneys are promoted a higher rate; there is more room to
move up. The coefficient for this variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. We
also find evidence that female SEC attorneys who are Short Term as of 2004 are less
likely to get promoted compared with male SEC attorneys who are Short Term. The
coefficient on Female is negative and significant at the 10% level.
3.4

Who Leaves the SEC?

We next look at who leaves the SEC, which we define as being no longer
employed by the SEC in 2016. Recall from Table 1 that 48% of the attorneys employed
by the Division in 2004 were still there in 2016, so slightly over half of the attorneys
employed in 2004 had departed by the end of our sample period.
For our test, we employ a Cox proportional hazard model. Our dependent variable
is leaving the SEC (1=left the SEC in any given year) from 2004 to 2016. The Cox
proportional hazard model we estimate is as follows:
h(t, X) = h0(t)ex'β
In the Cox hazard model, h(t, X) is the hazard rate. The Cox model is
semiparametric and does not require us to make assumptions about the baseline hazard
rate, h0(t). In the Cox model, X represents the vector of regressors and β is a vector of
estimated coefficients. For our first model (Model 1), we include variables for the
number of years the attorney has spent at the SEC (Experience) and an indicator variable
for whether the SEC attorney is age 55 or older as of 2004 (Close to Retire). These
variables control for the increased tendency of those with more experience and those
closer to retirement to leave the SEC. We also include variables Female, NLJ 250 Prior
Partner, Prior Government Attorney, Top Law School, Regional Office, Staff Attorney,
and Top Manager. We posit that partners are large law firms (Prior NLJ 250 Prior
Choi & Pritchard
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Partner) are likely to be coming to the SEC to burnish their credentials and are unlikely to
stay. Attorneys in Regional offices may have fewer attractive employment opportunities
because they are typically outside the major financial centers. Moreover, the cost of
living in those cities may be more manageable. (Some former attorneys that we spoke to
discussed the difficulty of sending children to college on a government lawyer’s salary on
top of the cost of living in New York or Washington.) The management experience of
attorneys in the Top Manager role may make them more attractive to outside employers;
conversely, the limited responsibilities of Staff Attorneys may make them less attractive.
We report the results in Model 1 of Table 5.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Not surprisingly, those SEC attorneys who are close to retirement are more likely
to depart from the SEC. In Model 1 of Table 5, the coefficient on Close to Retire is
positive and significant at the 10% level. In Model 1, those close to retirement have a
99.5% greater likelihood of departing the SEC compared with those who are not close to
retirement. Those who were a NLJ 250 Prior Partner are more likely to depart the SEC
(with a 67.5% increase in the probability of departure) and those who are top managers
are also more likely to depart (with a 75.2% increase in the probability of departure).
SEC attorneys at a Regional Office are 24.6% less likely to depart compared with SEC
attorneys in Washington DC or New York City.
Turning to gender, the coefficient for Female is negative and significant in Model
1. Female SEC attorneys have a 26.4% lower likelihood of departing the SEC compared
with male SEC attorneys. To examine whether the propensity of female SEC attorneys
relative to male SEC attorneys to leave the SEC changes with experience, we add
interaction terms between Female x Experience and Female x Close to Retire to Model 1
and report the results in Model 2 of Table 5.
In Model 2, note that the interaction term between Female and Experience is
above 1, indicating that while female SEC attorneys are less likely to depart the SEC
compared with male attorneys, this differential narrows as female attorneys spend more
time at the SEC. The coefficients in Model 2 indicate that female attorneys with more
than 18 years at the SEC become more likely to depart the SEC compared with their male
counterparts. This pattern offers some support to Hypothesis #3 suggesting that gender
has an important interaction with age and time at the SEC in determining likelihood of
leaving the SEC. This pattern lends support to the supposition that family obligations
may affect career choices for the women in our sample. Women are more likely to stay,
but not women who have been in the Division the longest.
As a robustness test of the relationship of gender for newly hired SEC attorneys
and the likelihood of departure we re-estimated Model 1 only for the Short Term SEC
attorneys as of 2004 and omit Close to Retire from the model. Unreported, the coefficient
for Female in the model is less than 1 (0.601) and significant at the 5% level. Short Term
female SEC attorneys are 39.9% less likely to depart the SEC compared with Short Term
male SEC attorneys in any given year from 2004 to 2016.
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In order to assess the effect of performance on likelihood of departure, we
compute our measures of performance (10b-5 Cases, Any Cases, Individual Cases, Other
Regulator, and Officer Resignations) up to the end of 2010 for each SEC attorney. We
then estimate a hazard model with leaving the SEC as our dependent variable (1=left the
SEC in any given year) for those SEC attorneys who are still attorneys as of the end of
2010. The base model includes as independent variables for Experience, Close to Retire,
and Female. Due to possible collinearity between other attorney characteristics (NLJ 250
Prior Partner, Prior Gov. Attorney, Top Law School, Regional Office, Staff Attorney, and
Top Manager) and our measures of performance we omit these other attorney
characteristic variables from the base model. We report the base model as Model 1of
Table 6. In separate models reported in Table 6, we add to the base model 10b-5 Cases as
an independent variable (Model 1), Any Cases (Model 2), Other Regulator (Model 3),
Individual Cases (Model 4), and Officer Resignations (Model 5).
[Insert Table 6 here]
In Model 1, the coefficient for 10b-5 Cases is greater than 1 and significant at the
one percent level. Attorneys involved with more 10b-5 cases are more likely to leave the
SEC. Similarly, in the other models, the coefficients on Any Cases, Other Regulator, and
Individual Cases are all greater than 1, indicating that higher performance is correlated
with a greater propensity to leave the SEC.
Overall, these results are inconsistent with the “revolving door” hypothesis that
posits that attorneys may go soft in enforcement actions to curry favor with outside
employers. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Consistent with Hypothesis #6,
attorneys who produce tangible results for the agency appear to be more likely to have
attractive outside employment options.
3.5

Who Goes Where?

Our last set of regressions explores the destinations of enforcement attorneys who
leave the division. We divide the sample of departing attorneys into several categories.
The base category consists of attorneys who remain at the SEC as of 2016. The remainder
are divided into six categories: 1) Private Practice, Associate or Counsel; 2) Private
Practice, Partner; 3) Financial or Compliance Industry; 4) Non-Profit or Academia; 5)
Other Government; and 6) Retirement or Non-Legal/Compliance Industry. We posit that
our first three categories, attorneys who leave the SEC to become associates or partners
in law firms or a position in the financial services industry, are motivated, at least in part,
by monetary returns. The latter three categories are consistent with individuals who are
not motivated primarily by financial rewards. We use these categories as the dependent
variable in a single multinomial logit model with the base category for each being
remaining at the SEC, so each of the six columns represents a different type of leaving
the SEC and each is compared pairwise with staying at the SEC. The multinomial logit
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model is as follows:
Prob(Employment Type After SEC)i = α + ß1iExperiencei
+ ß2iClose to Retirei + ß3iFemalei
+ ß4iExperience x Femalei
+ ß5iClose to Retire x Femalei
+ ß6iNLJ 250 Prior Partneri + ß7iPrior Gov. Attorneyi
+ ß8iTop Law Schooli + ß9iRegional Officei
+ ß10iStaff Attorneyi + ß11iTop Manageri + εi
The independent variables are the same as Model 2 of Table 5. We present the
results in Table 7.
[Insert Table 7 here]
We see that experience does not correlate with securing highly paid employment
after leaving the SEC. The coefficient for Experience is negative and significant for the
Private Practice Partner and Financial or Compliance Industry categories, while it is
positive and significant for the Retirement or Non-Legal/Compliance category.
Focusing on gender differences, women are less likely to leave to become
partners at law firms or work in the financial industry or in compliance, so they are not
securing the highest-paid post-SEC employment. This offers some support for
Hypothesis #4. This relation is mitigated, however, for women with more experience.
This suggests that younger women are either less interested or less successful in securing
these highly-paid positions after leaving the SEC, but that is not true for older women.
We find other significant correlations for Staff Attorneys: they are significantly
less likely to become law firm partners and significantly more likely to head for the last
category, Retirement or Non-Legal/Compliance. (This category includes one attorney
who became a therapist). By contrast, Top Manager is positive and significant for the
Private Practice, Partner and Financial or Compliance Industry categories. This
correlation suggests that top level experience at the SEC is a marketable credential when
seeking employment in the private sector. The opportunities for attorneys departing the
Regional Offices are more limited. We find negative and significant coefficients for the
Private Practice, Partner and Financial or Compliance Industry categories, as well as the
Other Government category. Presumably that last category is a more popular destination
for attorneys in the Washington, DC office. Serving as a government attorney before
joining the SEC (Prior Government Attorney) is positively correlated with becoming an
attorney with another government entity after leaving the SEC.
Our last set of tests looks at the relation between performance at the SEC and
destination upon departure from the SEC. We compute our measures of performance
(10b-5 Cases, Any Cases, Individual Cases, Other Regulator, and Officer Resignations)
up to the end of 2010 for each SEC attorney. We then estimate a multinomial logit model
using the same destination categories as in Table 7 with staying at the SEC as the base
category only for those SEC attorneys who were still at the SEC at the end of 2010. The

Choi & Pritchard
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/127

Page 17
18

Pritchard and Choi:

base multinomial logit model is as follows:
Prob(Employment Type After SEC)i = α + ß1iExperiencei
+ ß2iClose to Retirei + ß3iFemalei
+ ß4i10b-5 Casesi + εi
In the base model (Model 1) we include independent variables for Experience and
Close to Retire to test the importance of tenure at the SEC as well as the prospect of
retirement on the destination of a person who leaves the SEC. We also include an
indicator variable for Female to test the importance of gender. We include 10b-5 Cases as
the performance measure. We do not include the other independent variables from the
multinomial logit model of Table 7 because of possible collinearity with the difference
performance measures. In separate models, we replace 10b-5 Cases with the following
performance measure variables: Any Cases (Model 2), Other Regulator (Model 3),
Individual Cases (Model 4), and Officer Resignations (Model 5) as independent
variables. In Table 8 we report only the coefficients for the performance variables from
the multinomial logit models.
[Insert Table 8 here]
The coefficients for the performance variables are all positive and significantly
related to Private Practice Partner. This result, in conjunction with the results from Table
7, suggests that departures from the SEC are not only correlated with performance, but
that the departure is related to a high-paying destination after leaving the SEC. This
offers additional support to Hypothesis #6. The performance coefficients are generally
insignificant in relation to other destinations, with the exception of Other Regulator,
which is positive and significantly related to Non-Profit or Academia, albeit only at the
10% level.
4.

Conclusion

What is the career path of an SEC enforcement attorney? Our paper provides
evidence that longer term SEC attorneys tend to underperform other SEC attorneys,
consistent with the hypothesis that higher performers may leave the SEC before
becoming a long termer. We find evidence that the higher performers at the SEC are
more likely to depart the SEC, consistent with the Long Term SEC attorneys correlating
with underperforming attorneys.
We also find gender matters for the career trajectory of attorneys at the SEC.
Among the group of relative new hires as of 2004 (Short Term SEC attorneys), we find
that women and men perform equally well at the SEC. Nonetheless, when we look at how
Short Term SEC attorneys progress in their careers at the SEC after 2004, we find that
women tend to get lower pay increases and fewer promotions. One explanation for this
differential is that women tend to be less likely to leave the SEC at least initially in their
careers. When women do leave the SEC, they tend to go to lower paid positions, less
likely to end up in private practice partnership and financial or compliance industry jobs
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after the SEC. To the extent the threat of departure, particularly to a higher paying job,
may lead the SEC to offer higher compensation and greater promotions to retain an
attorney, the decreased willingness to depart on the part of female SEC attorneys may
lead to lower pay and fewer promotions.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Enforcement Division Attorneys
Panel A: Full Sample Measured in 2004
Variable

N

Mean

Median

SD

Experience

406

13.9

13

7.169

Close to Retire

406

0.037

0

0.189

Short Term

417

0.472

0

0.500

Long Term

417

0.149

0

0.356

Female

417

0.300

0

0.459

NLJ 250 Prior Partner

359

0.067

0

0.250

Prior Gov. Attorney

359

0.175

0

0.381

Top Law School

410

0.456

0

0.499

Regional

417

0.439

0

0.497

Staff Attorney

410

0.371

0

0.484

Top Manager

410

0.229

0

0.421

Panel B: Full Sample Variables Based on 2004 to 2015 data
Variable
N
Mean

Median

SD

SEC 2016

413

0.475

0

0.500

10b-5 Cases

417

0.081

0

0.169

Any Cases

417

0.145

0

0.322

Individual Actions

417

0.099

0

0.202

Other Government

197

0.092

0

0.170

Officer Resignations

417

0.075

0

0.154

Average Base Pay Change %

394

0.055

0.051

0.022

Bonus Ratio

397

0.008

0.003

0.013

Promotions Per Year

374

0.135

0

0.228
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Table 2: Who Performs Well at the SEC?
Model 1
10b-5 Cases
0.00183
(0.12)

Model 2
10b-5 Cases
-0.0185
(-0.93)

Long Term

-0.0354
(-1.16)

-0.0485
(-1.20)

NLJ 250 Prior Partner

0.0272
(0.61)

0.0233
(0.51)

Prior Gov. Attorney

-0.0160
(-0.87)

-0.0172
(-0.94)

Top Law School

-0.00547
(-0.34)

-0.00263
(-0.17)

Regional Office

-0.0426*
(-2.45)

-0.0420*
(-2.40)

Staff Attorney

-0.0258
(-1.53)

-0.0166
(-1.20)

Top Manager

0.116**
(3.05)

0.0960**
(3.25)

-0.0427**
(-2.77)

-0.0829**
(-3.82)

Short Term

Female
Female x
Staff Attorney

0.0392
(1.59)

Female x
Top Manager

-0.0736+
(-1.78)

Female x
Short Term

0.0728*
(2.58)

Female x
Long Term

0.0301
(0.66)

0.0981**
0.110**
(5.58)
(5.27)
N
353
353
Adj R2
0.096
0.091
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Constant
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Table 3: Who Performs Well at the SEC? Alternative Metrics
Panel A
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Any Cases
Individual
Other
Cases
Regulator
Short Term
0.0308
0.00403
0.0126
(1.23)
(0.23)
(0.61)

Model 4
Officer
Resignations
0.0156
(1.12)

-0.0821+
(-1.93)

-0.0587+
(-1.69)

-0.0232
(-0.49)

-0.0322
(-1.16)

NLJ 250 Prior
Partner

0.0103
(0.18)

0.00487
(0.13)

0.0140
(0.37)

-0.0109
(-0.40)

Prior Gov.
Attorney

-0.0312
(-1.02)

-0.0280
(-1.28)

0.000173
(0.01)

-0.0213
(-1.28)

Top Law School

-0.0115
(-0.45)

-0.00322
(-0.17)

0.00425
(0.23)

0.00734
(0.51)

Regional Office

-0.0885**
(-3.12)

-0.0452*
(-2.18)

-0.0683**
(-3.38)

-0.0203
(-1.27)

Staff Attorney

-0.0470+
(-1.81)

-0.0377*
(-2.01)

-0.00490
(-0.25)

-0.0287*
(-1.97)

Top Manager

0.210**
(3.40)

0.146**
(3.21)

0.115**
(3.02)

0.105**
(3.06)

Female

-0.0285
(-0.81)

-0.0342+
(-1.71)

0.0279
(0.64)

-0.0158
(-0.92)

Female x
Staff Attorney

0.0511
(1.10)

0.0422
(1.43)

-0.0337
(-0.67)

0.0159
(0.70)

Female x
Top Manager

-0.119+
(-1.68)

-0.0867+
(-1.73)

-0.0785
(-1.16)

-0.0808*
(-2.04)

0.0813**
(3.76)
165
0.118

0.0704**
(4.46)
353
0.073

Long Term

0.154**
0.115**
(5.20)
(5.38)
N
353
353
Adj R2
0.101
0.097
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Constant
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Panel B
Model 1
Any Cases
Short Term

-0.0138
(-0.45)

Model 2
Individual
Cases
-0.0258
(-1.10)

Long Term

-0.108*
(-1.97)

-0.0756+
(-1.68)

-0.0584
(-1.09)

-0.0422
(-1.17)

NLJ 250 Prior
Partner

0.0029
(0.05)

-0.0004
(-0.01)

0.0063
(0.17)

-0.0144
(-0.51)

Prior Gov.
Attorney

-0.0344
(-1.12)

-0.0301
(-1.38)

-0.0054
(-0.19)

-0.0221
(-1.33)

Top Law School

-0.0083
(-0.33)

-0.0005
(-0.03)

0.0056
(0.31)

0.0094
(0.64)

Regional Office

-0.0865**
(-3.07)

-0.0439*
(-2.12)

-0.0693**
(-3.52)

-0.0193
(-1.20)

Staff Attorney

-0.0376
(-1.53)

-0.0289+
(-1.83)

-0.0141
(-0.70)

-0.0265*
(-2.11)

Top Manager

0.176**
(3.66)

0.122**
(3.44)

0.0963**
(3.05)

0.0826**
(3.07)

Female

-0.119**
(-3.40)

-0.0936**
(-3.51)

-0.0826**
(-2.72)

-0.0656**
(-3.09)

Female x
Short Term

0.156**
(3.17)

0.106**
(3.10)

0.107**
(2.73)

0.0737**
(2.77)

Female x
Long Term

0.0628
(0.94)

0.0403
(0.76)

0.139
(1.47)

0.0170
(0.41)

0.107**
(4.41)
165
0.141

0.0858**
(4.87)
353
0.072

0.183**
0.134**
(5.21)
(5.36)
N
353
353
adj. R2
0.106
0.098
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Constant
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Model 3
Other Regulator
-0.0133
(-0.59)

Model 4
Officer
Resignations
-0.00585
(-0.32)
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Table 4: Raises, Bonuses, and Promotions at the SEC
Model 1
Average Pay %
Increase
-0.0130+
(-1.68)

Model 2
Bonus Ratio

Model 3
Promotion Rate

-0.00551*
(-1.98)

-0.0269
(-0.36)

Prior Gov.
Attorney

-0.0068
(-1.57)

-0.0020
(-1.00)

-0.0667
(-1.56)

Top Law School

0.0028
(0.74)

-0.0015
(-0.83)

0.0463
(1.19)

Regional Office

-0.0073*
(-2.00)

-0.0006
(-0.34)

0.0125
(0.35)

Staff Attorney

0.0121**
(3.41)

-0.0016
(-0.84)

0.105**
(2.96)

Top Manager

0.000646
(0.08)

0.00759
(0.93)

0.119
(1.21)

Female

-0.0069+
(-1.86)

- 0.0001
(-0.06)

-0.0684+
(-1.80)

0.0630**
0.00918**
(15.83)
(3.40)
N
167
173
r2_a
0.093
0.007
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

0.119**
(3.25)
167
0.036

NLJ 250 Prior
Partner

Constant
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Table 5: Hazard Models for Who Leaves the SEC?
Model 1
0.989
(-0.72)

Model 2
0.976
(-1.44)

Close to Retire

1.995+
(1.82)

2.770*
(2.27)

Female

0.736+
(-1.77)

0.378*
(-2.33)

Experience

Experience x
Female

1.055+
(1.88)

Close to Retire x
Female

0.427
(-0.96)

NLJ 250 Prior Partner

1.675+
(1.84)

1.744+
(1.94)

Prior Gov. Attorney

1.042
(0.21)

1.056
(0.27)

Top Law School

1.146
(0.92)

1.151
(0.95)

Regional Office

0.754+
(-1.80)

0.739+
(-1.92)

Staff Attorney

1.181
(0.81)

1.181
(0.80)

1.762**
(3.01)
N
352
pseudo R2
0.011
ll
-1024.0
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Top Manager
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1.760**
(2.98)
352
0.013
-1022.1
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Table 6: Hazard Models of Who Leaves the SEC? Performance Measures
Model 1
0.941**
(-2.68)

Model 2
0.940**
(-2.73)

Model 3
0.941**
(-2.67)

Model 4
0.941**
(-2.69)

Model 5
0.941**
(-2.68)

Close to Retire

9.486**
(3.15)

9.427**
(3.14)

8.544**
(3.03)

8.386**
(3.03)

8.382**
(3.01)

Female

0.473*
(-2.37)

0.430**
(-2.65)

0.453*
(-2.51)

0.430**
(-2.64)

0.458*
(-2.48)

10b-5 Cases

1.265**
(2.85)

Experience

Any Cases

1.138**
(3.26)

Other Regulator

1.141+
(1.89)

Individual Cases

1.385**
(3.42)

Officer Resignations
N
260
260
260
pseudo R2
0.030
0.030
0.025
ll
-343.9
-343.7
-345.7
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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1.149
(1.55)
260
0.032
-343.2

260
0.024
-346.1
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Table 7: Where Do They Go?
(1)
Private Practice
Associate or
Counsel
-0.0827
(-1.31)

(2)
Private Practice
Partner

(4)
Non-Profit or
Academia

(5)
Other Government

(6)
Retirement or NonLegal/Compliance

-0.0785+
(-1.95)

(3)
Financial or
Compliance
Industry
-0.204**
(-3.81)

0.0824
(0.73)

-0.157*
(-2.11)

0.230**
(2.73)

Close to Retire

2.402
(1.50)

1.157
(0.94)

-24.28
(-0.00)

-25.51
(-0.00)

-24.96
(-0.00)

1.761
(1.23)

Female

1.405
(1.15)

-3.213*
(-2.44)

-2.711**
(-2.97)

1.190
(0.50)

-0.493
(-0.43)

0.570
(0.25)

Experience x
Female

-0.265+
(-1.71)

0.141+
(1.82)

0.183**
(2.61)

-0.0113
(-0.08)

0.0800
(0.93)

0.0087
(0.07)

Close to Retire x
Female

-26.44
(-0.00)

-28.60
(-0.00)

-3.332
(-0.00)

-0.625
(-0.00)

-3.353
(-0.00)

-0.400
(-0.15)

NLJ 250 Prior
Partner

1.002
(0.81)

1.087
(1.64)

0.940
(1.02)

-14.83
(-0.01)

2.940**
(3.30)

-0.662
(-0.47)

Prior Gov.
Attorney

0.452
(0.61)

-0.375
(-0.75)

0.636
(1.31)

-15.28
(-0.01)

1.673**
(2.58)

-0.155
(-0.19)

Top Law School

-0.411
(-0.80)

-0.229
(-0.67)

0.394
(1.12)

1.383
(1.50)

0.666
(1.30)

0.0241
(0.03)

Regional Office

0.660
(1.24)

-0.681+
(-1.96)

-0.705+
(-1.86)

-0.505
(-0.55)

-0.640
(-1.17)

-1.216
(-1.53)

Staff Attorney

0.133
(0.21)

-1.163*
(-2.25)

0.179
(0.39)

15.13
(0.01)

0.216
(0.33)

3.160*
(2.32)

Top Manager

-0.183

1.446**

1.056+

16.78

0.738

2.510*

Experience

Choi & Pritchard
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Constant

(-0.21)

(3.56)

(1.93)

(0.02)

(0.92)

(2.31)

-1.176
(-1.18)

0.738
(1.15)

1.176
(1.60)

-20.25
(-0.02)

-1.193
(-1.11)

-8.474**
(-3.88)
318
0.196
-395.4

N
pseudo R2
ll
Z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Where Do They Go? Performance Measures
Performance

N

Pseudo
R2

Variable (Measured from
2005 to 2010

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Private
Practice
Associate or
Counsel
0.436
(1.20)

Private
Practice
Partner

Financial or
Compliance
Industry

Non-Profit or
Academia

Other
Government

0.558**
(3.56)

0.024
(0.08)

0.321
(0.65)

0.209
(0.43)

Retirement or
NonLegal/Compli
ance
-12.812
(0.99)

(Model 1) 10b-5 Cases

220

0.1848

(Model 2) Any Cases

220

0.1788

0.194
(0.74)

0.290**
(2.85)

-0.157
(-0.63)

0.197
(0.96)

0.086
(0.46)

0.101
(0.33)

(Model 3) Other Regulator

220

0.1811

-0.043
(-0.05)

0.731**
(2.96)

-0.293
(-0.57)

0.696+
(1.94)

0.071
(0.14)

0.780
(1.48)

(Model 4) Individual Cases

220

0.1746

0.369
(1.38)

0.393**
(2.98)

-0.222
(-0.66)

0.157
(0.34)

0.159
(0.71)

-0.491
(-0.62)

(Model 5) Officer
Resignations

220

0.273
0.454**
-0.196
0.242
0.102
-14.002
(0.66)
(2.93)
(-0.55)
(0.49)
(0.34)
(-0.01)
z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Each row reports the coefficient on a performance variable from the following multinomial logit
model (with staying at the SEC as the base category):
0.1763

Prob(Employment Type After SEC)i = α + ß1iExperiencei + ß2iClose to Retirei + ß3iFemalei + ß4i[Performance Measure]i + εi
The performance variables are measured from 2005 to 2010 and the model is estimated only for individuals who still are at the SEC in 2010.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable
Definition
Experience
Equals 2004 minus the Law School Graduation Year for a particular
attorney.
Close to Retire

Indicator variable for individuals who are age 55 or older in 2004.

Short Term

Employed by the SEC in 2000 or later.

Long Term

Employed by the SEC in 1990 or earlier.

Female

Coded as 1 for women and 0 for men.

NLJ 250 Prior Partner

Partner at one of the 250 largest law firms in the US, as ranked by the
National Law Journal, before coming to the SEC.

Prior Government

Employed as a government attorney prior to joining the SEC.

Top Law School

Coded as 1 for top 18 law schools as ranked by U.S. News and World
Report in 1992.

Regional Office

Indicator variable coded as 1 if employed in a regional or district
office and 0 if employed in Washington, DC or New York.

Staff Attorney

Employed by the SEC at SK-14 or below.

Top Manager

Employed by the SEC at SK-17 and above. These attorneys typically
have the title of Assistant Director, Assistant District Administrator,
or Assistant Regional Director, or higher.

SEC 2016

Still employed by the SEC in June 2016.

10b-5 Cases

Average number of Rule 10b-5 cases per year (2004-2015) in which
attorney appeared.

Any Cases

Number of court cases per year (2004-2015) in which individual is
listed as counsel.

Individual Actions

Average number of cases per year (2004-2015) in which an
individual was named as a defendant in which attorney appeared.

Other Government

Average number of cases per year (2004-2015) in which individual
appeared that also involved an investigation by another government
agency.
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Officer Resignations

Average number of cases per year (2004-2015) in which individual
appeared which lead to the resignation of an officer of the issuer.

Average Base Pay
Change %

Average percentage increase in base pay for the SEC attorney from
2004 to 2014 or the last year the SEC attorney was employed at the
SEC if earlier than 2014.

Bonus Ratio

Ratio of bonus to base pay in 2014 or computed for the last year the
SEC attorney was employed at the SEC if earlier than 2014.

Promotions Per Year

Average number of ranks the SEC attorney is promoted per year from
2004 to 2014 or the last year the SEC attorney was employed at the
SEC if earlier than 2014. Ranks are determined based on the SEC’s
SK-1 through SK-17 and then SO-1 to SO-3 ranking system (with
one step up the ranks equal to 1 in the computation).
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